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The naval shipyards are complex industrial organiza-
tions operated by the Naval Ship Systems Command in support of
the fleet. They are sited in widely separated installations,
employing approximately 90,000 civilian specialists comprising
over 10 different trades and almost every technical discipline
Naval shipyards have been with us almost as long as the
Navy Department. In 1798, the year the Navy Department was
established, the first Secretary ordered surveys of possible
sites for government shipyards. Six yards were authorized in
1799, one to build each of six seventy-four-gun ships-of-the-
line. Sites were purchased during the next two years at key
points along the co£ist of the new nation - at Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, at Boston, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C.
,
and Norfolk.
The yards were constantly changing, adjusting to meet
the needs of the fleet. Some, like the Washington Navy Yard,
cease functioning as a shipyard when they are no longer needed.
New yards are created to meet new needs, as at Charleston, on
the West Coast, and in Hawaii. Today, the New York Shipyard
has been closed, and Portsmouth is being phased out over a ten
1

2year period. Two shipyards on the West Coast merged and, after
a few years, were separated again. All of this adjusting has
left a toteil of nine "permanent" shipyards - four on the East
Coast (Charleston, Norfolk, Philadelphia, and Boston), four on
the West Coast (Puget Sound, Long Beach, Hunters Point and Mare
Island) , and one in Hawaii (Pearl Harbor)
.
The Naval shipyards have survived many a challenge to
their existence. Indeed there are strong forces who are of the.
opinion that our nation cannot afford naval shipyards and would
be better off without them. Several years ago, Edwin M. Hood,
President of the Shipbuilders Council of America, said:
I refer to the stifling competition the private
shipyard industry has day in and day out, year in
and year out, from the eleven naval shipyards and
one naval ship repair facility.
1
By owning and operating these shipyards which
duplicate all that the commercial yards can do, the
Federal Government is, in fact, slowly suffocating
the Private Shipyard Industry of the United States.
No other major industry in this great nation is
plagued by such insidious destruction under govern-
ment auspices.
2
Variations of these charges against the naval ship-
yard complex appear in speeches, in the press, and in Congres-
sional reports. Branded as "high cost" and "tax free," the
naval shipyards are pictured as a government institution
^•The Navy now has nine shipyards and no ship repair
facility in the U.S. It is difficult to tell how much in-
fluence President Hood's campaign had on the closing of the
other activities.
2J. J. Meyer, Jr., "Our Nation's Shipyards," U. S .
Naval Institute Proceedings (November, 1964), pp. 34-45.

3operated to compete with, and flourish at the expense of, the
"low cost," "tax paying" private yards. Accused of driving
the private shipyards out of business, the Naivy is charged
with the simultaneous destruction of the mobilization poten-
tial of such yards.
The foundation of the private shipyard's case against
the Navy is that through the free enterprise system the nation
will be able to achieve greater economic effectiveness and a
better defense capability at lower cost. In short, by elimi-
nating what they consider the "unfair competition" represented
by the naval shipyards, more work will be placed with the pri-
vate yards , thus improving our economic system and strengthen-
ing the responsiveness of the fleet.
The Navy's argument centers on the principle of mili-
tary responsiveness. Fundamental to the Navy's justification
for a strong in-house shipyard capability is the military re-
quirement that logistic support must be responsive to the
operating forces.-*- Fleet operations, fleet maintenance, and
fleet base support are basic to naval strength. Since 18 01,
the Navy has viewed its shipyards as an integral part of our
nation's naval strength afloat.
By statute, the Navy is responsible for the construc-
tion, armament, equipment, and deployment of ships of v/ar.
The Navy relies upon naval shipyards for a large portion of
^-Operating forces consist of the Fleet Commanders,
Type Commanders, and the individual active fleet ships.

4the logistic support to fulfill this statutory responsibility.
The mission of the naval shipyards as defined in lav; and Navy
Regulations is a single-minded one, to serve the fleet. Pri-
vate yards have no stated public mission. Despite the fact
that they enjoy what amounts to a public subsidy based on
broad considerations of national interest, their purpose is
primarily to make profits for their private owners.
Perhaps the most significant difference of all between
the two types of shipyards is in the range of services per-
formed. The naval shipyard, whose mission it is to serve the
fleet, is not only equipped to perform every conceivable type
of repair service, but also all fleet support services neces-
sary to maintain a ship and its crew. Industrial facilities
and skills are available to service all the complex, and some-
times classified, weapons systems and machinery components of
advanced design. There are few repairs which their shops can-
not handle.
Besides this, the naval shipyard provides a full range
of personnel and logistic services - barracks and dining halls,
classroom and recreation facilities, hand tools and work
spaces, offices and storage cages, tugs and cranes, supply
department and ship's store, dispensary and dental clinic,
technical library and blueprint files, photo laboratory, fuel
depot, and chapel. These are supplemented by other facilities
which, under separate command, customarily occupy space on the
yard as tenant activities. All exist to provide service to the
ships and their crews.

5Few, if any, such "fringe benefits" are offered by
private shipyards. Often the lew bidder is many miles from
the home port of the ship or from any Navy facilities. The
crew may have to live on board even when work is in progress
or the Navy may have to furnish its own berthing barge to give
the ship's personnel a place to live and work. In the case of
a new ship, it is customary to have the fitting out and final
loading of store and equipment completed at a Navy yard be-
cause few contractors are equipped to accomplish this phase of
the work. There is also the checking out and calibration of
delicate electronics gear, requiring special test ranges and
instrumentation available only at naval installations.
Another area of concern is related to the very basic
question of cost. In 1962, the Shipbuilders Council of
America lobbied through Congress a bill requiring the Navy
to spend in private shipyards at least 35 per cent of the
funds made available for ship repair, alterations, and con-
versions. This prompted the Navy to hire a consulting firm
to analyze the costs of the private and naval shipyards.
This action was reported in the newspapers as follows:
. . . The Navy, apparently, wanted to hog more of
this work for its own shipyards.
So the Navy spent $197,000 of the taxpayer money
to hire a consulting firm to analyze the costs, ap-
parently in the hope it would show Navy costs were
lower. The consulting firm's report said private
shipyards were cheaper. So the Navy made the report
"unavailable." But the nosy reporter got a copy and
printed a story about it.^
1
"Ships, Reports, and Tax Dollars," Washington Daily
News , June 20, 1963, p. 4.

6The private shipbuilders also conducted a study and
the same reporter printed his conclusion that this study also
said private shipyards were cheaper. The private shipyards
make the point that, based on unbiased cost studies by two
reputable accounting firms, it has been proven that costs in
naval shipyards are much higher than in private shipyards
.
The supporters of the private shipyards erroneously imply that
these higher costs are applicable to all shipyard work, in-
cluding the repair and overhaul of war ships.
The first study to be produced was undertaken for the
private shipbuilders by the accounting firm of Ernst and Ernst.
A representative of the firm stated to a Congressional Com-
mittee that they were unable to break out the cost that could
be identified as new construction versus repair, alteration,
and conversion. The President of the Shipbuilders Council,
in referring to the report, said that:
. . . Experts, on the basis of exhaustive in-
vestigations, agree that private yards can build,
repair, alter, and convert ships at a cost of 20
per cent to 28 per cent below the cost of having
the work done in . . . naval shipyards.
^
The second and by far most comprehensive study was
performed by Arthur Andersen and Company.-* This report reached
the following general conclusions concerning costs:




•*Arthur Andersen and Company, Report on Survey and
Analysis of Difference Between U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Costs
at Naval and Private Shipyards , Report to Bureau of Ships,
Department of the Navy, November 30, 196 2.

1. That certain private yards could perform nev/
construction work at less cost than naval ship-
yards.
2. Costs for conversion, repair and alteration
are roughly equal.
3. Higher overhead costs of the naval shipyards
are attributable to higher fringe benefits and
more direct salary or wage personnel per non-
supervisory hourly worker in production shops.
The Andersen report admits great difficulty in devel-
oping samples of comparable work. Many naval shipyard experts
have taken issue with the conclusions of the Andersen report
because of some of the methods used in the area of compara-
bility. Specifically, they discredited the way in which de-
preciation allowance, Federal income tax, and interest on in-
vested capital were computed and compared.
In a speech before the Senate, Senator Daniel Inouye,
of Hawaii, recognized the disparity in these particular areas
and concluded ;1
While it is difficult to establish a valid base
for recomputing all of the adjustments which have
been contested, we consider it fair and reasonable
to reduce depreciation charges to 27 per cent of the
amount used in the Andersen report and to eliminate
the interest on invested capital . . .
. . . As repeatedly emphasized in the Andersen
report, the fringe benefits paid by naval shipyards
constitute a significantly large overhead burden.
Such benefits as annual leave, sick leave, holidays,
jury duty and military leave boost naval shipyard
costs, based on overall averages, to $1.29 per
direct labor hour as compared to $0.84 for private
shipyards; a big difference of $0.45 per direct labor
hour. For new construction work the difference is
$0.57 per hour, which, in the construction of a
Polaris submarine, penalizes naval shipyards by over
$3 million.
^Congressional Record - Senate , October 3, 1963,
pp. 17753-17759.

8If we again make an adjustment for fringe
benefits to reflect a truer and more accurate
statistical picture by combining this fringe
benefit adjustment with the adjustments, for
depreciation and interest on invested capital,
naval experts find that the cost advantage of
private shipyards have been pared as follows:
1. For the 598 class of nuclear attack sub-
marines from 15.2 to 4.5 per cent.
2. For the 598 class of Polaris submarines
from 20.3 to 10.8 per cent.
3. For the DLG-9 Coontz class guided-missile
frigate from 18.7 to 8.2 per cent.
4. And for the CVA-59 class of supercarrier
from 29 to 17.2 per cent.
Although certain statistical adjustments, as mentioned
above, tend to reduce the cost differential between naval and
private shipyards, the fact is that on a straight dollar- for-
dollar basis, the naval shipyard is not usually competitive
with private yards in new construction of naval ships. This
point is not contested by the Navy and is not really the issue.
Indeed, this is one of the main reasons that over 8 per cent
of the Navy's ships are built in private yards. As a matter
of fact, only three of the naval shipyards are designated as
new construction yards and only approximately 50 per cent of
their work is devoted to new construction. The rest is for
conversion, alteration, and repair. No one naval shipyard is
a totally new construction shipyard such as in private in-
dustry.
There is an overwhelming tendency among the private
yards to use these statistics to support a contention that
private industry can do the entire job of the naval shipyard
cheaper. Neither Ernst and Ernst nor the Andersen report
support this view.

9Cost effectiveness is indeed an important considera-
tion, but it is not the only one by which military effective-
ness must be measured. It is unfortunate for the naval ship-
yards that their disadvantages are readily summarized in terms
of gross cost, whereas their advantages are not easily trans-
lated into dollars and cents.
In view of the fact that complaints have been lodged
against naval shipyards since their beginning and they still
manage to retain a vital position in our nation's defense
structure, it is assumed that their continued existence is
relatively secure. This paper does not attempt to justify
the existence of naval shipyards but to study some measures
for improving their performance. It was felt necessary,
however, to mention some of the arguments for and against
naval shipyards.
Purpose of the Study
This subject has been of particular concern and inter-
est to the author since serving as the Supply Officer of a
ship undergoing an extensive overhaul at one of the naval
shipyards. Interest and concern were heightened during a
later tour of duty as Material Officer at one of the Navy's
Ship Repair Facilities.
It can be argued that failure to maintain an effective
level of equipment capability, including technological advances
as well as routine preventive maintenance, will contribute
significantly to the lack of optimum efficiency and economy.
There are restrictions now placed on the naviil shipyards in
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regard to acquisition and replacement of capital assets v/hich
could retard the attainment of the proper level of equipment
capability. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the
current physical condition of the United States naval ship-
yards 1 plant and equipment with an eye toward improvements in
that condition through a realistic and more flexible capital
replacement procedure.
Scope of the Study
This paper deals specifically with one aspect of an
industrial type installation. That installation is the naval
shipyard and the particular aspect is replacement of capital
equipment. This involves a discussion of the way in which
shipyards are funded for their operations and the current
procedures for capital replacement.
Naval Ship Systems Command is currently conducting a
large-scale, comprehensive shipyard modernization program.
This program involves all nine shipyards and will attempt to
reduce the unit cost, balance the industrial capacity, and
provide capabilities required by changing technology.-1- The
specific aim of this paper is to analyze methods which can be
used to help shipyards maintain a current state-of-the-art
when that position has been achieved through the moderniza-
tion program.
Although this paper deals specifically with naval
shipyards, there is no reason to believe the concepts would
-•-W. N. Ginn, "New Approach. Developed to Modernize Naval
Shipyards," -Navy Management Review (July, 1963), p. 12.
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not be applicable in other activities utilizing the indus-
trial fund method.
Chapter Two discusses the very urgent problem of
shipyard modernization. Naval shipyards generally have
reached the stage where obsolescence looms as a very real
threat to the fulfillment of their fleet logistic support
mission. Existing facilities lack much required modern
equipment and adequate space layout in which to properly
utilize it. An ambitious modernization program has been
undertaken by the Naval Ship Systems Command, but it will
take many years and much money to accomplish its purpose.
One of the most important innovations in the method
of financing and operations in naval shipyards was the in-
stallation of the Navy Industrial Fund concept. The intro-
duction of this system lifted the naval shipyards out of the
dark ages of financial and management information. Benefits
derived through increased economy and efficiency of opera-
tions have been impressive. In Chapter Three, the Navy In-
dustrial Fund is explained. Pertinent legislative authority
is cited along with some recent changes, and recommendations
for further changes are made.
Chapter Four is concerned with methods of acquiring
adequate funds for replacement of capital assets, when needed,
The procedure which is currently employed is examined and
some of the more prominent deficiencies are discussed. The
Navy Industrial Fund as it now exists does not allow for de-
preciation of equipment as an element of cost. Depreciation,
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along with some other costs, is recorded statistically, but
the industrial fund is never reimbursed for these costs.
Various investigative bodies have recommended that these
costs be included in charges to customers, but the Depart-
ment of Defense has not seen fit to introduce such a procedure.
Accumulation of funds for replacement of equipment is dis-
cussed.
Control over capital expenditures is another cause
for concern. Accumulation of a reserve for replacement does
not necessarily imply that the shipyard commander can utilize
those resources in any manner suitable to him. This aspect
is also discussed in Chapter Four.
The method and base for depreciation is worthy of
some comment and is touched upon in Chapter Four. Related
to this discussion, of course, is the application of a
suitable and appropriate index to determine the current
value of the dollar.
Finally, some parallels are drawn with an industrial
activity which utilizes funds collected through depreciation
charges to keep technologically up-to-date. Economic advan-





The current condition of the United States Naval Ship-
yards does not easily reflect the strong sentiments which have
been expressed in their favor. If these "inseparable parts of
our operating forces" are to remain effective in fulfilling
their mission of serving the fleet, it is obvious that some
heed must be taken of their physical state. Many people, for
a number of years, have been interested in the modernity of
the naval shipyards, not the least of these being the Congress
of the United States, the Department of Defense, and the Naval
Ship Systems Command.
During this period of time many investigations have
been conducted and have pointed up the deficiencies and the
major problem areas in the shipyards. One of the first prob-
lems is one of age. Naval shipyards range in age from about
165 years to one that is twenty-five years old. They are, in
most instances, in World War I facilities, using World War II
machinery and working on 19 68 ships.
In March, 19 66, the Naval Ship Systems Command awarded
a contract to Kaiser Engineers and its associated firms to
produce a long range modernization program for the naval ship-
yards. Naval Ship Systems Command set forth the following




1. Convert the complex from a "job shop" to a
selective "process type" industry.
2. Develop a master industrial plan for each
shipyard and for the total complex.
3. Determine optimum level of substituting
capital for labor.
4. Reduce labor content of each job through the
application of advanced technology and modern
facilities and equipment.
5. Reduce cost and turn around time.l
The Kaiser Engineers' report was published in 19 68,
and revealed some alarming facts. 2 The major areas considered
were categorized as follows:
1. Waterfront facilities.
2. Production equipment systems.
3. Electronics - Weapons - Precision systems.
4. Support systems.
Certain deficiencies were found to be common to each of these
four major areas. These include over-age and obsolescent
facilities and equipment, inadequate capacity to meet the pro-
jected workload, and lack of capability to meet specific work-
load requirements.
Some major deficiencies of the entire Naval Shipyard
Complex are presented through discussion of the four major
areas mentioned above.
U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, Hearings, Military Construction Appropria-
tions for 1969 , 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1968), p. 551, (hereafter referred to as
Military Construction Hearings, 1969).
^Kaiser Engineers, Oakland, California, Engineered
Long Range Modernization Program for the U.S. Naval Shi pyards ,





The first two drydocks constructed in this country
were completed in 1833, at the Boston Navy Yard and Gosport
(now Norfolk) Navy Yard, and are still in operation. Over
the next 100 years, the Navy's graving docks increased in
number to twenty-seven, and during World War II the number
increased to fifty-six. Two more have been constructed since
World War II.
Recent advances in ship and ship systems' design have
created serious deficiencies in the naval shipyards' existing
docking facilities. The effect on the required drydock depth
imposed by sonar dome projection and nuclear submarine devel-
opment has rendered many drydocks obsolete. During World War
II, the Navy had forty graving docks and seventy-one floating
docks which could accommodate the destroyers and submarines of
that period. The Navy now has only sixteen graving docks for
modern destroyers and submarines and nine floating docks for
deep draft submarines. Destroyer escorts, with a ten foot
projecting dome, are now docked on keel blocking twelve feet
high and require what used to be identified as a cruiser dry-
dock. VJhereas twenty feet of water sufficed for World War II
submarines, Polaris submarines now require thirty-seven feet
of water over the drydock floor.
Repair berthing facilities suffer from structural
deficiencies which are generally the result of insufficient
funding since World War II to maintain adequately and accom-
modate high density utilization of over-age pier structures.
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They also have deficiencies which are due to the increasing
requirements imposed by modern ship technology.
Production Equipment Systems
The production equipment systems of the naval ship-
yard complex are comprised of more than twelve thousand pieces
of major production equipment, representing an original in-
vestment of about $13 million. It ranges in complexity from
conventional machine tools to sophisticated numerically con-
trolled equipment. However, a significant feature of these
equipment systems is that more, than one-half of the presently
used equipment was acquired prior to 1944. Only about 3 per
cent has been procured since I960, and the average age is
approaching a quarter of a century. •*• The retention of a
viable and responsive fleet support capability will not be
achieved without a substantial upgrading in production equip-
ment systems. Kaiser Engineers envisions corrections to the
following general deficiencies in production equipment systems
which are common to all shipyards:
Existing production equipment is generally over-
abundant, obsolete, and uneconomical, having been
procured hastily in large numbers during wartime
crises.
Many production facilities are comprised of in-
adequate, sub-standard, outdated and uneconomical
structures which were not designed for the functions
they now house.
Existing production flow is handicapped by un-
suitable building configurations, random location
of shops, duplication of material inventories,
llbid
. , p. 11-21.
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excessive material handling and inconvenient lo-
cation of personnel support facilities.!
Electronics - Weapons - Precision Facilities
Deficiencies generally found in all shipyards in-
elude
:
1. Inadequate space to perform tasks required by
the projected workload.
2. Inappropriate building configuration, which
makes good work flow and job sequencing un-
obtainable.
3. Dispersion of Electronics, Weapons, Precision
functions into multiple location throughout
the yard.
4. Inadequate environmental controls (temperature,
vibration, humidity, clean room, radiation,
security, ventilation)
.
5. A lack of weight handling equipment for large
antennas and other components.
6. Generally obsolete electronics support equip-
ment that is inaccurate, overly complicated
to operate and in poor condition due to
excessive handling.
7. A lack of specialized test equipment.
Support Systems
The naval shipyard support systems include the
following
:
1. Utilities and services.
2. Facilities for such support functions as
Engineering and Management, Quality and
Reliability Assurance; and support facilities
such as waterfront crane systems and supply,
storage, parking, and laydown facilities.
3. Shipyard structures.
The support systems are the most neglected areas of







capability expansion, dictated by advances in ship and weapons
technology, has been accorded priority when funding approval
has been sought.
Shipyard utilities are not only deficient with respect
to capacity, but also the distribution systems are in such
poor condition that extensive replacement and upgrading is
required to maintain even the present levels of support.
Few shipyard structures have been demolished since the
various yards were established, and the average building age
at a given yard is, therefore, to some extent a function of
the date of the yard's commissioning. At Boston Naval Ship-
yard many of the buildings are over 100 years old and are of
granite block construction with huge ceilings, difficult in
every way to maintain. In contrast, the Long Beach buildings
were largely constructed during World War II under the austere
wartime construction policy.
The United States Naval Shipyard Complex has a capital
investment of about $1.3 billion, its estimated replacement
value is $3.2 billion, and it docs an average annual business
of $1.24 billion. Naval shipyards constitute the largest and
most complex job shop organization in existence. In most
cases, the paucity of funds for naval shipyard equipment and
facility improvement has been responsible for the existing de-




^Military Construction Hearings, op cit
. , p. 55 0.
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hand, to support a composite Navy comprised of over-age ships
equipped v;ith modern electronics and weapons systems, and, on
the other, to construct and maintain the expanding nuclear
Navy.
The exhaustive study conducted by Kaiser Engineers
determined that a total investment of $992 million over the
next ten year period would be required to achieve a minimal
level of modernization under the broad goals stated earlier.
A program value analysis of the modernization programs-
indicated that if the modernization program had been fully
implemented in fiscal year 1967, and if the projected volume
level for fiscal year 1972 had been accommodated in the mod-
ernized shipyards, naval shipyard operating costs, projected
at $1.24 billion could have been lower by $103.4 million, a
reduction of 8.3 per cent. Further, once the improved facil-
ities are in place, an increase in work load of approximately
15 per cent can be accommodated with current shift configura-
2tions. The distribution of the total $992 million investment
and the direct economic benefits of $103.4 million among the
nine shipyard sites is presented in Exhibit 2-1.
•^Booz-Allen and Hamilton, V7ashington, D.C., Program
Value Analysis, Naval Shipyard Modernization Program , Report
to Naval Ship Systems Command, Department of the Navy, May,
1968.
o
The modernization program was based on the peacetime
requirement of an eight-hour day, five-day a week basis. Fa-
cilities and equipment were engineered on this basis and, by
use of more than one shift per day and overtime, projected
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The above benefits are predicated upon sound manage-
ment action in taking advantage of the potential savings made
possible by the improved facilities. The modernization pro-
gram includes $15 million for design and development of im-
proved shipyard management information systems. The subject
of shipyard management is beyond the scope of this paper but
is of utmost importance in improving the overall efficiency
and effectiveness of United States Naval Shipyards.
In summary, naval shipyards have reached a precipice.
Dramatic action and great expense has been found necessary to
prevent collapse with resulting disastrous consequences. The
action is being taken and, in fact, the naval shipyards are
being modernized. This is a long and costly process. One
must, of necessity, reflect upon the causes that placed the
naval shipyards in the condition in which they are now found
and wonder if the same thing may not be true a quarter of a






"Working capital funds, sometimes called 'revolving'
funds, are those funds established with a fixed amount of
capital to take care of a manufacturing or service operation
which is self-sustaining in nature. "^
Before Working-Capital Funds
Prior to the middle of the century, the manufacturing
and service operations of the Department of Defense operated
on an appropriation structure whereby numerous appropriations
were required to support an activity, and many Bureaus were
involved in the financial responsibility. Because of the
many appropriations granted to each activity or program, it
became almost impossible to evaluate the performance or
measure the results of the money spent. Where materials,
supplies or services desired by one unit were to be secured
from another unit the operation would be financed by annual
Congressional appropriations to the supplying unit; the con-
suming unit would requisition the desired supplies or services
from the producing unit but would not pay for them out of its
l-Lloyd Morey and Robert P. Hackett, Fundamentals of






own appropriation. Supplies and services thus acquired v/ere
known as "free issues."
It was a difficult task for any Bureau to be able to
furnish the exact cost of the complete operation of any one
activity or program. Fiscal responsibility was diffused.
Effective financial management was impossible.
For many years it had been recognized that a change in
the appropriations structure was necessary. Today, numerous
governmental supply activities have been established in re-
volving funds. The Department of Defense has the greatest
number of revolving funds. The authorization for the use by
the military of such funds was an outgrowth of the first
Hoover Commission report.
Authorizing Legislation
The Commission's work was based on the belief
that there exists in the United States the kind of
government and an economic system which will assure
the continuation of political freedom and economic
progress. This economic system is based on the
fundamental concept of private industry - not state
- owned and operated industry. The Department of
Defense is engaged in many business enterprises.
It is our belief that all such commercial and in-
dustrial activities that can be effectively per-
formed by private industry should be turned over
to private industry . . . Private industry should
be able to meet effectively the diverse and fluc-
tuating needs of the Government. Accordingly,
Government operation of business-type activities
to meet these needs is, in most cases, unnecessary.^-
Commission on the Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Subcommittee Report on Business
Enterprises of the Department of Defense (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, June, 1955), pp. 1-3.
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The Commission ' s report was presented to Congress in
January, 1949, and contained recommendations for promoting
economy and efficiency in the National Military Establishment
On August 10, 1949, Congress passed Public Lav/ 216, under
which working capital funds were authorized by sections 4 05
(a), 405(b), 405(c), and 405(d) as follows:
(a) In order more effectively to control and account
for the cost of programs and work performed in
the Department of Defense, the Secretary of De-
fense is authorized to require the establishment
of working-capital funds in the Department of
Defense for the purpose of —
1. financing inventories of such stores,
supplies, materials, and equipment as
he may designate; and
2. providing working capital for such
industrial-type activities, and for
such commercial-type activities as
provide common services within or
among the departments and agencies
of the Department of Defense, as he
may designate.
(b) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and
directed to establish on the books of the Treasury
Department at the request of the Secretary of De-
fense the working-capital funds established pur-
suant to the authority of this section.
(c) Such funds shall be —
1. charged, when appropriate, with the
cost of stores, supplies, materials,
and equipment procured or otherwise
acquired, manufactured, repaired,
issued, and consumed and of services
rendered or work performed, including
applicable administrative expenses;
and
2. reimbursed from available appropria-
tions or otherwise credited for the
cost of stores, supplies, materials,
or equipment furnished and of services




Reports of the condition and operations of such
funds shall be made annually to the President
and to the Congress.
(d) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to provide
capital for such working-capital funds by capital-
izing inventories on hand and, with the approval
of the President, by transfer, until December 31,
1954, from unexpended balances of any appropria-
tions of the military departments not carried to
the surplus fund of the Treasury: provided, that
no deficiency shall be incurred in any such appro-
priation as a result of any such transfer. To the
extent that such methods do not, in the determina-
tion of the Secretary of Defense, provide adequate
amounts of working capital , there is hereby autho-
rized to be appropriated, out of any monies in the
Treasury not appropriated for other purposes, such
sums as may be necessary to provide adequate work-
ing capital.^
Advantages of Revolving Funds
There are, of course, a number of advantages in re-
volving funds. Eric Kohler lists the following:
1. The supplying unit does not finance its acquisitions
by means of annual appropriations; its operations
are responsive to and limited by projected sales.
2. Where a buying unit may at its option purchase from
a supply unit or from an outsider if a better price
or service is offered, the resulting competition
should improve the efficiency of the buying opera-
tion and insure that its costs are kept to a mini-
mum. Economical buying becomes a specialty rather
than something incidental to a larger purpose.
3. The buying unit is freed from the burdens of con-
tracting, stocking, and inventorying.
4. The buying unit must include in its requests for an
appropriation amounts to cover purchases from the
revolving fund.^
'U.S., Congress, The National Security Act Amendment
of 19 49, Pub. L. 216, August 10, 1949.
2Eric L. Kohler and Howard W. Wright, Accounting in
the Federal Government (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 216.
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Revolving or working-capital funds designate govern-
mental structures, the revenues of which are employed without
appropriation; they are, therefore, self-perpetuating. The
working-capital fund for industrial-type activities in the
United States Navy is called the Navy Industrial Fund. Within
only a few years of the passage of the legislation mentioned
earlier, all naval shipyards were included in the Navy Indus-
trial Fund Program.
A Shipyard Industrial Fund
The initial working capital of a naval shipyard is
provided by an allocation of funds from the cash balance
(corpus) of the Navy Industrial Fund and by capitalization of
existing inventories of material and supplies. The amount of
employees accrued annual leave at the shipyard is established
as a liability upon commencement of operations under the in-
dustrial fund. The net amount of this working capital is
thereafter utilized by the shipyard as a revolving fund to
finance the costs of producing goods and services ordered by
customers of the shipyard. The industrial fund is reimbursed
by billing the appropriations of the customer for the costs
of goods and services furnished.
Customers place orders for manufacture, repair, al-
teration, and other services with the particular shipyard
chosen to produce or render such services. After acceptance
by the shipyard, the customer records the amount of the order
as an obligation against appropriations available for the
purpose in the same manner as when orders or contracts are
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placed with private concerns. The liability of the customer
is limited by the amount and terms of the order. Costs of the
goods and services produced are billed to the customer. Ac-
crued costs in excess of a project order do not constitute an
over-obligation, provided that the project order is not billed
in excess of the amount authorized. In this respect, the
issuer of the project order must be contacted to renegotiate
the project order amount. In the event renegotiation cannot
be made, the project order is billed only for the authorized
amount. The difference between the accrued costs and the
amount billed is absorbed by the Navy Industrial Fund. These
bills provide the basis for charging the appropriations and
liquidating the obligations of the customer and at the same
time reimbursing the working-capital of the shipyard.
An industrial fund activity bills the ordering agency
for performance of work and services on the basis of costs in-
curred by that activity, or on the basis of fixed prices or
predetermined rates established to recover such costs. In-
asmuch as Industrial Fund activities are theoretically oper-
ated on a "zero" profit or loss basis, these activities are
required to minimize gains and losses on individual orders
through improved cost estimating and cost control.
Exhibit number 3-1 illustrates the cycle of opera-
tions under Navy Industrial Fund financing.
The revenues of the Navy Industrial Fund are obvi-
ously dependent upon operating volume and the pricing policy
followed. Both are in turn dependent on the will of the
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Congress, since appropriations to the customers of the fund
must precede purchases.
Determination of Overhead Rate
Prices in naval shipyards are usually at cost and it
is, therefore, necessary to identify the costs to be included
in the price computation. This is particularly true with re-
spect to various types of overhead. Overhead costs include all
costs which are not capable of being directly charged to a
specific product or service. This inability to identify costs
to a specific order could stem from lack of a direct relation-
ship, or because the cost of establishing an accounting system
to measure the relationship would exceed the benefits to be
derived.
These types of costs are accumulated in overhead ex-
pense accounts established by cost centers. Overhead costs,
those associated with production as well as general and admin-
istrative, are applied to direct job orders on the basis of
predetermined rates multiplied by direct labor hours per job
order. The direct labor hours applicable to general and admin-
istrative overhead are the total direct labor hours of the
production cost centers utilizing the services of the general
and administrative cost centers of the shipyard. The appli-
cation of overhead provides management with financial control
of overhead costs in productive and service activities.
The overhead rates are calculated prior to each
fiscal year and may be changed quarterly or more frequently
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if necessary. Exhibit number 3-2 illustrates the concept of
application of overhead at a naval shipyard.
Certain "statistical costs" are not included in the
overhead when computing prices. The term "statistical costs"
as used in accounting for industrial operations of Department
of Defense revolving funds covers costs applicable to revolving
fund operations but paid for by some other organizational unit.
In this sense, statistical costs include depreciation of fixed
assets.
Legislative Changes
Legislation authorizing the use of revolving funds in
the Department of Defense did not initially permit the inclu-
sion of depreciation as an expense in determining prices
except those charged to non-Department of Defense customers. -*-
Kohler surmised that Congress apparently wanted to approve
specifically fixed asset acquisitions by reviewing proposals
therefor, and was reluctant to permit the building up of cash
resources in revolving funds through the inclusion of depre-
ciation charges in prices, fearing the dissipation of cash
resources on nonessential assets prior to the replacement of
essential ones.
Although the legislation did not initially permit the
inclusion of depreciation as an expense in determining prices,
^One of the rules of doing business for non-Department
of Defense parties is that no loss shall be incurred.
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there has since been a codification of Title IV of the National
Security Act into Title Ten of the United States Code wherein
some of the wording was changed as follows
:
(c) Working-capital funds shall be charged, when
appropriate, with the cost of --
1. supplies that are procured or other-
wise acquired, manufactured, repaired,
issued, or used; and
2. services or work performed; including
applicable administrative expenses,
and be reimbursed from available
appropriations or otherwise credited
for those costs, including applicable
administrative expenses and costs of
using equipment . 1- (underscoring added)
This information was received with a degree of enthu-
siasm in some Navy circles. An article appearing in a Navy
publication shortly thereafter carried the following statement:
In codifying section 405 on working-capital funds,
the question of authorized charges was clarified by
making an express provision for working-capital funds
to be reimbursed for the 'cost of using equipment. 1
This legislation represents the most important
development in industrial funding since the Congress
created the authority for the working-capital funds in
the Department of Defense, and it has obvious operating
and financial management implications. The prices
charged by industrially funded activities will be more
representative of the costs of producing the products
or rendering the services. The customers of these
activities will then be in a better position to assess
value received for total dollars expended. Since
equipment replacement will be financed as an overhead
expense, activity management can be expected to give
even more consideration to their equipment replacement
requirements and, from their view, assess value re-
ceived, from improved productivity, for dollars ex-
pended.
Concerning the implementation of this legislation,
the first required step is a change in the Industrial
Fund Regulations. In addition, it will be necessary
to time-phase the implementation to allow for its
^-United States Code; Title 10; 2208(c), (1) and (2).
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effect on customer funding, and on the cost of work
undertaken on the basis of fixed price agreements.
Considering these and other details, it appears that
this important change to industrial fund procedures
cannot be implemented until Fiscal Year 1964, and
then probably only on a partial basis.
1
The Fiscal Year 1964 deadline was, perhaps, optimistic
but the fact is that "the mechanics for charging this cost to
customers 1 appropriations" have not yet been promulgated.
This slight alteration of the legislation took more than ten
years to effect and it appears to be an admission that some
change in the industrial fund operation is required. Naval
shipyards do not benefit fully from the advantages available
in a working capital fund operation. They are not self-
sustaining nor self-perpetuating in that they are dependent
upon appropriated funds to improve or replace fixed assets.
This will be discussed in the next chapter.
In this chapter we have looked briefly at the history
and advantages of the Navy Industrial Fund Program. It is
safe to say, I feel, that this concept is sound and completely
justified in the activities in which it is being utilized.
There is no question that many of the problems inherent in
appropriation structure employed prior to the middle of the
century have been solved by the working-capital fund concept.
There is, however, room for improvement. The next chapter will
deal with some suggestions for potential dynamic improvements.




So far as we may judge from the territory sur-
veyed by \70rking parties and others , it is safe to
say, with only slight risk of exaggeration, that
Britain knew hov; to build great industries, but
never learned how to rebuild them. At their in-
ception, they were the last word in modernity and
efficiency, a model to the world. But they became





This would appear to be quite an indictment on any
industrial society. And yet evidence has been presented that
would indicate that the United States Naval Shipyards are
guilty of this same shortcoming. There are many reasons why
such a situation could come to exist and the naval shipyards
are not fully to blame, but the question that must now be
faced is — what can be done to prevent this great industry
from once again becoming decrepit with age?
Current Replacement Procedure
In answering this question, it is necessary to examine
the procedure which is currently being employed to replace
capital equipment. This procedure generally follows the cus-
tomary budgeting pattern. Capital equipment expenditures are
proposed by the shipyard commanders. These proposals are made
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Technological









to the Naval Ship Systems Command many months in advance of
the anticipated acquisition. Naval Ship Systems Command puts
together a package for submission to the Department of the Navy
making whatever adjustments are deemed necessary so that total
equipment acquisitions are within the limit of funds estab-
lished by the President's budget objective. These require-
ments are then subject to justification before various levels
of the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget.
Capital equipment expenditures are contained in a separate
sub-title of the budget.
After Congressional review, the appropriations are
processed through Congress. The funds resulting from appro-
priation are then made available through channels to the ship-
yard. This is a very lengthy and time consuming process.
Not only must the shipyard commander make his requests known
many months in advance, but he must live with the inevitable
delays which seem to be inherent in our budgetary process.
These unscheduled delays have a deleterious effect on workload
forecast and on planning in general
.
Maintenance Becomes the Only Alternative
When the requests are finally acted upon, the funding
to shipyards in support of equipment requirements often differs
'-For the last few years, government activities have
been operating on the prior year budget figures well into the
current year's operations before nev; appropriations have been
approved by Congress. The Fiscal Year 71 budget had already
been sent to Congress before the Fiscal Year 7 budget was




considerably from amounts requested. There are, perhaps , a
number of reasons why this is usually the case. The procure-
ment of a piece of production equipment does not carry the
same priority nor "glamour" as do modern weapon systems or
rocket launchers, and in the perennial give and take of the
budget squeeze, the projects on the end of the priority list
are the ones which are deferred or reduced almost to nothing.
The bit and piece cutting has deteriotive effects in naval
shipyards, in the fleet, and in many other areas. It becomes
a one-sided competitive contest which has the end result of
forcing continued maintenance of tools and equipment far
beyond the point of economical repair. There have been many
instances where average annual maintenance costs on plant
equipment was as high as 70 per cent of replacement cost of
the same equipment. Costs for maintenance are funded through
the Navy Industrial Fund as a part of overhead expense. In
the absence of appropriated funds for acquisition of replace-
ment equipment, the manager has little alternative but the
uneconomical one of expending maintenance funds for equip-
ment which has been determined beyond economical repair. The
ready availability of one source of funds over another causes
the manager to choose the alternative which is not the low
cost alternative from the point of viev; of the Government as
1Chief, Bureau of Ships letter, serial 704-301,
August 3, 1959, Subject, "Funds to Replace Plant Equipment
Beyond Economical Repair;" Chief, Bureau of Ships letter,
serial 2751-400, July 21, 1959, Subject, "Costs of iMinor
Acquisitions and Improvements of Capital Property."
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a whole. Of course, these types of decisions reach a limit
where the only alternatives available are to stop production
or purchase replacements. One is reminded of the statement
of Professor Hatfield who said that "all machinery is on an
irresistible march to the junk heap, and its progress, while
it may be delayed, cannot be prevented by repairs."-'- Experi-
ence indicates that this statement has become painfully true
with respect to naval shipyards (and, no doubt, with all other
industrial activities -- government and non-government) , and
the problems created by this fact are becoming increasingly
important. Aging has a twofold impact on equipment perfor-
mance. First, the costs of operation are an increasing
function of age; second, the rate of output decreases with
equipment age. Consequently, the equipment's net benefits
are a decreasing function of equipment age.
Funding Equipment Costs
One of the basic principles underlying the installa-
tion of the Navy Industrial Fund was to give increased flexi-
bility of operation without the restrictions frequently forced
on operations by appropriation accounting. The requirement
for funding from a source other than the normal yard opera-
tions prevents shipyards frequently from achieving rather
considerable economies. One Navy comptroller wrote
:
. . . the product of the plant includes nearly all
costs including maintenance of buildings and equipment
^H. R. Hatfield, Accounting (Nov; York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1931), p. 130.
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as well as major repairs. Therefore, decisions in
the area of major maintenance are made by the Com-
manding Officer depending upon the effect they will
have on operating costs at the time. He does not
have to wait for funding authorization from higher
echelons. Of course, he must abide by Bureau direc-
tives which require approval for major maintenance
jobs but his operation will finance the cost in any
event. It is easier to obtain an administrative
decision than a funding authorization. x
Under the current procedures, it is difficult at best for ship-
yard commanders to plan and maintain modernization schedules
for their facilities. Costly interrupted production caused
by administrative delays in acquiring capital equipment when
it is needed are difficult to avoid.
One answer to this dilemma can be found in the Cooper
Committee Report.
The Committee has already adopted a stand on the
depreciation as applied to the military departments
in general
:
1. Depreciation accounting should not be employed
with respect to (a) weapons and other military
items, including ships, aircraft, and combat
vehicles, and (b) fixed assets used in carrying
out military missions or in the general admin-
istration of the Department, including buildings,
equipment and other facilities, except as pro-
vided below.
2. Depreciation accounting should be employed with
respect to (a) industrial and commercial activ-
ities, and (b) construction equipment and other
facilities consumed in the process of construction,
where depreciation charges constitute a signifi-
cant element of cost. Depreciation accounting
should be applied to the entire production plant,
i.e., buildings, machinery and equipment in indus-
trial and commercial activities. Moreover,
depreciation charges should be used as a factor
in determining the price of the product or services.
^Commander James M. Brogan, "Navy Industrial Fund Oper-
ations at Naval Ordnance Plant, Forest Park, Illinois," Navy
Comptroller Review, III (March, 1956), pp. 13-14.
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It would be advantageous for recoveries attributable
to depreciation charges for machinery and equipment
(but not for buildings) to be made available as a
source of financing for the continuity of machinery
and equipment, subject to appropriate safeguards such
as approval by higher authority, and necessary legis-
lative authority to this end should be sought. In the
absence of such authority or inability to obtain it,
such recoveries should be transferred to general
receipts of the Treasury along with the recoveries
related to depreciation of buildings. -*-
Another investigative body made a similar recommenda-
tion the next year.
A problem involved is the determination of when
to capitalize the costs of property and when to charge
such costs against operations.
Costs of capital assets used in industrial and
commercial type installations should be depreciated
over their useful lives and the resulting periodic
depreciation charges included as an element of
operating costs.
2
The practice of including depreciation charges as an
element of operating costs is not being employed in the naval
shipyards. E'epreciation costs are recorded statistically and
are reflected for the installation as a whole rather than being
alloted to particular jobs or programs. In the relatively
msignificant J cases where shipyards include a factor for
depreciation in billings to non-government customers, the
amounts thus received are deposited in the Treasury as
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report of the In-
dustrial Activities Working Group of the Advisory Committee on
Fiscal Organization and Procedures , 1954, pp. 33-34.
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Budget and Accounting Task Force Report
,
June 20, 1955, p. 41.
^Billings to non-government activities amount to less
than 1 per cent of total revenue.
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miscellaneous receipts and are no longer available to the Navy
Industrial Fund. There have been a great many proposals in
addition to those already cited for recording depreciation as
a cost at industrial fund installations, and for funding equip-
ment and other capiteil costs. Frederick Mosher said that "a
full-fledged working capital fund necessitates the costing of
virtually all resources utilized, including depreciation."
Arthur N. Lorig spoke out in favor of depreciation as an
element of cost when he said:
A working capital fund using its own depreciable
assets to serve other departments and operating on a
break-even basis must recover the cost of the assets
over their useful lives. The charge for the services
is set at the level necessary to cover the deprecia-
tion as well as other costs.
^
Sanders, Hatfield, and Moore wrote many years ago about the
multiple purposes of depreciation accounting:
The main purpose of the accounting provision for
depreciation is to allocate to the period a proper
amount of operating expense. A further purpose is to
maintain the capital investment intact ... It cannot
be too strongly urged that the maintenance of the orig-
inal investment, by adequate charges against earnings,
is the principal means by which the physical plant is
kept in up-to-date operating condition.
3
^Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgeting, Theory and
Practice with Particular Reference to the United States De -




^Arthur N. Lorig, "Depreciation as a Source of Funds,"
The Federal Accountant
,
XVI (November, 1967), p. 54.
•^Sanders, Hatfield, and Moore, A Statement of Account -





Upon analysis, the matter of funding of capital costs
becomes a many-sided problem. These questions are suggested:
1. Should capital costs as and if funded include all
land-use, building, and equipment costs or only
some of them?
2. Should depreciation and use costs be applied to
all assets, or only to recently acquired assets?
3. With respect to equipment, should all equipment
costs be funded, or should there be some exclu-
sions based upon such criteria as unit cost,
useful life or degree of utilization?
4
.
If certain capital costs are to be funded and
included as elements in bills rendered, what
disposition is to be made of the proceeds?
5. If certain capital costs are to be funded, and
the proceeds used to procure new equipment,
should the authority for such procurement be
exercised at a different point than it is now?
With respect to the first question, it is quite doubt-
ful that there would be much of a chance for achieving full
funding of land-use and building costs. The requirement for
specific Congressional approval of public works projects, the
fact that such costs are relatively sunk and the investment
in land and buildings relatively fixed, and the fact that such
huge items included in current billings and appropriations
would have the rather uncertain effect of having the Govern-
ment begin paying for these assets once more, all tend to
minimize the practical possibilities for funding this element
of cost.
With reference to capital equipment, it must be recog-
nized that, if these costs are funded and depreciation reserves
established, it does not necessarily follow that local manage-
ment can automatically replace equipment by using such re-
serves. It is quite conceivable that charges for depreciation
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may be authorized as a factor in bills rendered, and depre-
ciation reserves established, without changing in any respect,
present practices for authorization of equipment procurement.
This could be done in many ways: (a) amounts collected which
represented depreciation costs could be transferred to Trea-
sury miscellaneous receipts in the same way as is now being
done for non-government customers. This would make depre-
ciation a factor in all bills rendered while preserving the
present locus of equipment procurement authority, but would
overstate total defense costs since equipment procurement
costs would come to appear in Defense appropriations twice;
(b) by transferring amounts collected by reason of charges
for depreciation to the Other Procurement Navy (OPN) appro-
priation and subjecting such amounts to the normal budgetary
controls applicable to procurement accounts. This would have
the advantage over the first alternative of at least trans-
ferring the funds to an account which can be utilized by
other Navy activities. The OPN appropriation is currently
utilized for procurement of capital equipment when such pro-
curement is approved by Congress. There is no guarantee,
however, that these funds will be available for use by ship-
yards when required. The shipyards, who were responsible for
the collection of part of the funds through depreciation
charges, would have to compete for those funds with all other
activities vying for procurement appropriations; (c) by leav-
ing the depreciation reserve with the installation, but sub-
jecting equipment procurement there to budgetary limitations.
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One advantage of the second alternative over the third is that
depreciation reserves could then be used in areas where the
Department's current equipment needs were the greatest, which
would not necessarily be those places where the largest de-
preciation reserves accumulated. The advantage over the first
alternative is that the funds would be available to the in-
stallation and not lost in miscellaneous accounts.
A combination of the second and third alternative would
suggest an alternative which is similar to one that the Russian
government has been said to practice. That is that activities
pay into a centrally controlled fund the amounts recovered as
depreciation. When a need to acquire plant assets arises, that
activity having the need has first call upon the cash it has
paid into the fund, but unless that need develops, the money
can be used to finance the acquisition of assets for other
activities. This has the advantage of retaining the funds
collected for the benefit of those activities collecting them
while maintaining enough flexibility to transfer funds from
one type of activity (shipyard) to an activity of the same
type (another shipyard) . If a sudden and unexpected need for
plant assets arises, and the funds collected by that activity
having the need are depleted, funds can then be diverted from
one or more activities with less urgent requirements. These
decisions would be better made at the Department of Defense
level since those planners are in a better position to assess






The matter of funding equipment costs can be treated
totally aside, however , from whether there should be a change
in the locus of authority for equipment procurement. In gen-
eral, proposals for funding equipment costs seem to spring
from the premise that a more factual or "true" cost would
result, or because it seems to be a business-like thing to do.
If the reason for desiring true costs is that of management
appraisal, depreciation and other unfunded costs could now be
incorporated in all reports developed, and appended to all
bills. Everyone could be informed of true costs without in-
cluding depreciation in amounts charged for work performed.
There is little evidence that such information would have much
practical use. In the words of a former Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller), Wilfred J. McNeil:
. . . whenever depreciation is a cost factor in
making such decisions as make or Lay, or replacement
of obsolete facilities, cost computations can be made
on a statistical basis. These are one-time studies
on a highly selective basis. Comprehensive, con-
tinuous, monthly depreciation accounting on all fixed
assets is not required. Cost accounting should not
be designed so elaborately as to meet a theoretical
objective of providing every conceivable kind of
specialized cost data infrequently required. We have
to fight this mistaken view continuously, and the
difficulties exist as much with people having a man-
agement interest as with accountants.
1
While a "truer" cost might be a corollary of a charge for
depreciation, that should not be the primary purpose behind
such a proposal. Unless the whole gamut of costs such as
1" Financial Management i v the Department of Defense,"
The Federal Accountant, VII (March, 1953), p. 49.
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military personnel, employee fringe benefits, insurance,
interest, and taxes are included a "true" cost will not be
determined anyway.
Reserve for Mobilization
One difficulty that has to be taken into considera-
tion in applying a charge for depreciation to the customer
has to do with the unutilized or under-utilized capacity.
Naval shipyard capacity calculations are, and of necessity
must be, determined on the basis of emergency conditions.
This means that anything approaching full utilization of
resources will be confined to actual time or war or to times
of great imminence of war. All other degrees of emergency
will be periods of fractional utilization. This reflects
the fact that no peacetime naval shipyards are concerned with
two types of "end-product": (1) production of materials and
services, and (2) maintenance of industrial mobilization
capacity. The costs of these two types of end-product should
be budgeted and accounted for separately. Regulations
Governing Industrial Fund Operations contains the following
statement
:
The agency or command having management respon-
sibility for an industrial fund activity shall
budget and pay for the costs of maintaining un-
utilized or under-utilized plant and facilities.
The retention of such facilities must be specif-
ically approved by departmental headquarters as
essential in support of mobilization readiness. •*-
^Department of Defense Directive 7410.4. Subject,




Failure to recognize idle capacity as such simply means that
the overhead rate charged to production is too high. Yet,
most naval shipyards find that separation becomes a very dif-
ficult problem and never fully resolve the issue. To overlay
the already inflated overhead costs, therefore, with a charge
for depreciation would make the idle capacity cost problem
more acute by proportionately increasing the already signifi-
cant error caused by failure to recognize excess capacity.
This could have advantageous repercussions by forcing the
separation of excess capacity and requiring the funding of
such capacity through separate appropriation. This infor-
mation would be of significant assistance to Congress and to
the Secretary of Defense in making difficult decisions con-
cerning proper levels at which to maintain industrial activ-
ities.
Control of Equipment Procurement
Many proposals for including depreciation in end-item
costs seem to be grounded in the desirability of controlling
equipment procurement locally, and in gaining greater freedom
from the appropriation process. Thus, a comptroller writes:
We are of the opinion that a more factual cost
would be recorded if these depreciation costs were
included in product costs. Furthermore, we think
it would be highly desirable to establish reserves
for depreciation, and to permit the commanding
officer to make the decision as to the replacement
of capital equipment or the acquisition of new
equipment. At present, capital equipment require-
ments are the subject of separate financing and
normally involve a considerable time lag. At
Forest Park, we are in favor of granting the com-
manding officer more freedom in the management of
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his plant. This freedom would definitely be en-
hanced by the establishment of reserves from v/hich
capital equipment could be procured. *-
The local procurement of equipment, in response to locally
determined needs and subject to local authority, is frequently
held to be a "business-like" way of conducting affairs. Writ-
ing of business practice, however, Joel Dean observed:
Controls for capital expenditures need to be
more comprehensive and based on more thorough
analysis of individual projects and more far-
sighted anticipation of the future than any other
type of corporate control. This is so for several
reasons.
First, the responsibility for capital expendi-
tures inevitably rests at the very highest pinnacle
of management. Top management cannot delegate this
responsibility to managers of autonomous divisions.
Responsibility for capital expenditures is only
partly in the hands of the president. In form and,
to an important degree in substance also, it remains
in the hands of the board of directors.
Second, the stockholder is looking over manage-
ment's shoulder; the stockholder has a more direct
stake in decisions on capital projects than in most,
for after all it is his money that is being spent.
In these decisions, therefore, the trusteeship
function of management comes clearly to the surface.
Third, capital expenditure decisions are partic-
ularly intricate. They demand a high caliber of in-
vestigation, require many-sided judgment, and call
for forecasts that reach far into the future.
Fourth, capital expenditures are important. They
provide a framework for the company's future by deter-




In the area of long-term, high-dollar decisions which involve




^Joel Dean, "Controls for Capital Expenditures,"
Modern Management of Capital Expenditures (American Manage-




military industrial plant, and other broad policy matters, it
is not at all clear that capital decisions could better be
made locally than centrally.
On the basic issue of control, Assistant Secretary
Garlock of the Air Force told a House Subcommittee that, as
activities are financed through an industrial fund:
. . . capital costs will not be recouped by
service charges and it should not be. That is
the main control that Congress retains over the
size of all these activities because if you can-
not replace it out of your revenues, you are re-
quired to be back here every year for determina-
tion by the Congress as to the size of the opera-
tion. V7e think that should remain that way and,
therefore, we should not include in the charge
to the receiving agency charges large enough to
allow us to replace the capital items.
1
The possibility of relinquishing too much control of
capital expenditures to the industrial fund activity has been
one of the main deterrents to the proposals that a charge for
depreciation be included in the bills for materials and
services to the activity's customers. The loss of too much
control was a fear of Congress when the number of industrial
funds themselves began to increase so rapidly. This point was
expressed by Congressman Wigglesworth when, in speaking to
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franke, he observed that:
The view has been expressed, as you no doubt
appreciate, that the industrial fund and stock
fund principle has been carried too far, that it
is inadvisable, at least from the point of view
•U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of the Air




of the Congress, because it results in less con-
trol rather than more control over financial
operations.^
Congressman Wigglesworth then asked if the Navy's working-
capital fund operations would create "... greater con-
trol and greater economy." Mr. Franke replied:
Yes sir; and I would like to add that I have
never agreed with the statement that the use of
industrial funds and stock funds deprived the
Congress of control. In my own opinion, there
is perhaps more control by Congress because we
have industrial funds and stock funds. We pre-
pare budgets of industrial funds the same as we
prepare budgets anywhere in the Navy.
Budget controls for industrial funds operations differ
in some respects from operations where appropriation subdivi-
sions are cited directly as work is performed. However, budget
controls do exist and it is possible to integrate industrial
fund operations into the overall structure of budgetary con-
trol. Industrial funds are not something apart from the bud-
get system and control by Congress does not have to be circum-
vented .
Any request for capital expenditure could be con-
tained within the budget for approval through the normal
budgetary process. This would be an absolute must up to and
including the Department of Defense level because of the
broader spectrum of review necessary and the necessity for
expenditures to be in consonance with overall defense policies
and plans. It is easy to suggest giving the shipyard commander
^U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, Hearings , Department of the Navy




one piece of money and letting him manage within program
guidance to be furnished, but he cannot be expected to have
knov/ledge of the Navy's worldwide present and future needs
for various types of ships, technology, strategy, etc., unless
each shipyard commander equipped himself with a staff capable
of providing such information. Since this information must
be provided by higher authority, it would not be a difficult
matter to present proposals for capital expenditures in the
operating budget for subsequent approval. Control can be
executed by approval or disapproval of the shipyard's oper-
ating budget by higher authority.
Another facet of control was suggested by an official
of the Bureau of the Budget. In a recent interview by the
author, the point was made that, if a reserve for replacement
did in fact become a reality, the Bureau would take a close
look at the exemption from apportionment which the industrial
funds now enjoy. This review would be for the purpose of
possibly rescinding the exemption of that portion of the in-
dustrial fund designated as a replacement reserve. This could
prove to be cumbersome and not really necessary. Only that
amount of money necessary to procure equipment which is
currently needed would be involved in a request for approval
and to apportion that would be unrealistic.
'•The Director of the Bureau of the Budget is required
by lav; to apportion appropriations and funds although he may,
at his discretion, exempt certain accounts (including working-
capital funds) from such apportionment. At the request of the
Department of Defense, industrial funds were exempt from
apportionment by the Director in June, 1952.
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Method and Base for Depreciation
What should be the basis for a depreciation calcula-
tion and the method? The Industrial Activities Working Group
stated that "for industrial establishments the straight line
method based on historical cost is believed to be adequate
since this method and base are still by far the most commonly
used in private industry practice.
"
1
There are those, however, v7ho hold the view that the
real object of a sound depreciation policy is the correct
measurement of cost, in order that there may be recovered
each year a sufficient number of current dollars to equal
that year's capital consumption in terms of original dollars.
This group would state that under a "historical cost" basis
the costs are understated and capital is consumed without
recovery. Insufficient depreciation charges, therefore,
tend toward the dissipation of capital. This, in turn, may
make it difficult to finance those replacements of plant and
machinery that are necessary to maintain productive efficiency
There is a consequent difficulty to modernize.
Depreciation viewed in this light has been referred
to as economic depreciation or price-level depreciation.
There are those who go so far as to say that "the cost-
principle of depreciation is a Socialist State principle,
and it results in the dissipation of capital in a manner that





can be used to destroy the private capital system which main-
tains our system of living." 1
While this analysis is probably somewhat extreme, it
is worth observing that the price-level adjustment of depre-
ciation does maintain the capital that was originally invested
at its current price-level value. In an industrial fund activ-
ity, this would mean the recovery of more cash 2 for eventual
replacement purposes while at the same time stating costs in
current dollars. Since revenues are stated in current dollars
this would approach the proper matching of costs and revenues.
Hence, both the revenue and revenue deductions would be ex-
pressed in homogeneous dollars.
On what basis, then, should a price-level adjustment
be made? The employment of index numbers to adjust for changes
offers the best prospect for a simple and practical solution.
There are a number of indices available such as the consumer
price index and various construction or equipment cost indices.
Since no specific index has been developed for this purpose,
Leonard Spacek, "Inflation in Business," A speech
before the Cincinnati Control of the Controllers Institute
of America, September 10, 1957.
2The Industrial Activities Working Group made the
following comment concerning the use of the term "cash":
Some heat has been generated about the propriety of the use
of the term "cash" in industrial fund accounting. This
seems to be a very minor detail. The present arrangement
is that the United States Treasurer acts as the "banker,"
and that every disbursing officer is well aware of the
amount of his authority to spend against his treasury
balance. Whether this is to be called "cash," "treasury
balance," "authority to spend," or "liquid claim upon
society's productive capacity" is a low order semantic
problem. (Industrial Activities Working Group, p. 50.)
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the important consideration would be that all naval shipyards
utilize the same index. The application of these index numbers
does not require any complicated accounting or mathematical
computation.
It is not the purpose of this paper to argue the rela-
tive advantages or disadvantages of the historical cost-
principle and price-level depreciation. In either instance,
a reserve for capital replacements could be established and
a big step toward maintaining an up-to-date plant will have
been taken. The Bureau of Engraving and Printing is a good
example of this fact. They also use the revolving fund con-
cept and include depreciation charges on equipment as part of
the sectional overhead costs in rendering bills to their cus-
tomers. In a pamphlet published by the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing, the following paragraph is included:
The Bureau's program for planning and accomplish-
ing improvements in facilities and technology was
given added impetus when it was authorized to use
the working capital fund method of operations and
the related business-type techniques and procedures
for budgeting and financing capital replacements
and improvements. Under the former annual appro-
priation systems funds were available only for
obligations incurred during the fiscal year for
which appropriated. Uncertainty as to what funds
would be available for total planned acquisitions
had the effect of impairing the long-range planning,
designing and developmental work necessary to effi-
ciently develop or procure highly specialized equip-
ment. 1
J-The Department of the Treasury, Synopsis of Fi -
nancial Management in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing
,
May, 1968, p. 14.
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In a telephone conversation with the Chief of Finan-
cial Management at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, the
author learned that the historical cost principle is used in
computing depreciation. While this is better than no depre-
ciation at all, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing has had
to ask Congress for an increase in the amount of their working
capital on several occasions. An example was cited whereby a
piece of machinery was purchased in 1965 for $300,000 and to-
day that same piece of machinery has increased in price by
almost 4 2 per cent.
Allowing for Profit
The point is well taken that a reserve for deprecia-
tion probably will not be sufficient to cover the cost of
replacing capital equipment. Increases in technology alone
will create a gap between that amount recovered and the amount
necessary for procurement. In the world of business, the
additional funds required for replacement over and above those
provided by depreciation provisions represent investment of
new capital that may come from profits, loans, or other
sources
.
The manager of a shipyard does not have these alter-
natives available. New capital must be appropriated by Con-
gress and he is forbidden from making a profit in his opera-
tion. At least two sources have spoken out in favor of allow-
ing a profit within established parameters. The Industrial
Activities Working Group, in expressing their preference for
a fixed price said:
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At best, the setting of fixed prices would
almost certainly bring about a net profit or net
loss. A net profit would be interpreted by the
customers as proof that prices had been too high,
and raise the question as to whether: (a) a re-
fund is in order, (b) the establishment would be
obligated to turn the profits in to the treasury
as miscellaneous receipts, or (c) the establish-
ment would be allowed to keep the profits as an
expansion of its capital.
The third possibility seems to be favored,
with the possible provision of upper limits. It
has been suggested that allowable profits be set
at one per cent of the first $1,000,000 of volume,
and one-half of one per cent on higher volumes.
Some such limited profits rule would keep the
customers from feeling gouged, provide a modest
reserve for losses in less successful periods,
and would, in a long period of successful opera-
tion, provide small amounts of additional working
capital under the control of the local management.
Whether the particular limits suggested are the
most desirable or not, the principle involved seems
sound.
1
Another proponent of profit in naval shipyards is
John Haldi, who wrote that "... yards which show a 'profit'
should be allowed to keep and apply some amount of it towards
capital improvements. The amount retained might be something
like 20 per cent of all profits earned but not exceeding a
maximum of one per cent of total sales."
Bureau of Census Plan
A unique proposal for using the amounts collected for
depreciation for financing an equipment replacement program was
•'-The Industrial Activities Working Group, op cit .
,
p. 50.
^John Haldi, Unpublished Article entitled, "Internal
Markets as a Means to Greater Efficiency in the Defense De-
partment," September 20, 1963.
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suggested by the Bureau of the Census. Their plan contem-
plated that the annual salaries and expenses appropriation
made to the Bureau would be used to initially finance all
replacement equipment purchases and that appropriation would
subsequently be reimbursed from other appropriations on the
basis of depreciation of equipment actually used in per-
forming work for the activities that are financed by these
appropriations. In other words, one appropriation would be
charged when other appropriations are properly chargeable
and a later adjustment of funds would be necessary to record
the charges to the proper appropriation.
This type of scheme is similar to an alternative
mentioned earlier^ and would require legislative authority
inasmuch as Section 1210 of the General Appropriations Act,
1951, 64 Stat. 765, provides that "no funds made available
by this or any other act shall be withdrawn from one appro-
priation account for credit to another, or to a working fund,
except as authorized by law." Inasmuch as legislative author-
ity would undoubtedly prove difficult to achieve for a pro-
posal of this nature, it would be unwise to pursue this al-
ternative as a solution to the naval shipyards' problems.
This proposal is indicative of the fact, however, that al-
ternatives are available.
^Department of Commerce, Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for Administration, letter of May 28, 1958.




A more feasible alternative, perhaps, would be to
utilize the funds available to the shipyard commander in
the form of the Navy Industrial Fund to procure replacement
equipment. This would be in the nature of a loan from the
Treasury since revolving funds deposited in the Treasury are
not represented as a "pool of money" but only represent the
authority to draw on the Treasury. The shipyard could pro-
cure the necessary equipment within certain guidelines or
parameters and within the constraints of the revolving fund
and "repay" the fund through a charge for depreciation on
the bills rendered to the customers.
The precedent has been set by the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing which follows a similar procedure.-'- In the budget
document they identify long-range planning as it relates to
capital expenditure. This does not constitute a request for
appropriation. If no one questions the proposed acquisitions
through the series of hearings which must take place, their
approval is assumed and the acquisition is accomplished.
This could be a workable procedure for the naval ship-
yards and the problem of how and when to begin could be an-
swered by capitalizing the current equipment and including it
as an asset of the industrial fund. Present regulations do
not cover this important point except to say that "...
plant and equipment shall not be included as assets of the
interview with Chief, Office of Financial Management,
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, March 16, 197 0.
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industrial fund, except as specifically authorized by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). However,
memorandum accounts will be established in the industrial
fund general ledger for such assets and the related reserve
for depreciation. "-*-
Improvements are Economical
There are solid economic reasons why naval shipyards
must be allowed to improve the state of the art at their
various activities. Increased productivity at less cost has
been the overriding advantage of a flexible and realistic
equipment modernization schedule. Experience at the Bureau
of Engraving and Printing can attest to this fact. From 1951
through 1967, the average annual salaries and wages of their
employees increased by 94 per cent and the average cost of
material increased approximately 25 per cent. In addition,
they assumed additional annual costs of over $5 million which
were not covered in their expenditures prior to the insti-
3tution of the revolving fund. These included such things
as the guard force, the disbursing function, employee health
and insurance program and the civil service retirement fund.
In spite of these significant increases, the technological
improvements introduced during the same period have resulted
-'Department of Defense Directive 7410.4, op cit .
, p. 8
The following information is based on data contained
in Synopsis of Financial Management in the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing .
^The Bureau of Engraving and Printing started conduct-
ing its business under the revolving fund concept in 1951.
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in an annual recurring savings of some $18.5 million. The
benefits achieved through the technological improvement pro-
gram for currency, for example, are reflected in the fact
that the unit cost rate per thousand notes has been reduced
from $9.92 in Fiscal Year 1951 to $8.14 in Fiscal Year 1967.
This happened in the face of spiraling increases in labor and
materials
.
Some tests which have been conducted at various naval
shipyards also attest to the v/isdom of keeping capital equip-
ment modern and efficient. Exhibits 4-1 and 4-2 are two
examples of these tests. Aside from a considerable annual
savings in dollars, there is a significant reduction in the
number of man hours required. This could result in a faster
job by fewer men with the consequence of returning ships-of-
the-line to the operating forces in a more expeditious manner.
Fewer ships would possibly be required to perform the same
tasks as are now being performed. The skill level of those
men required could be raised, however, to a point where it
could cause some nagging recruitment problems.
These exhibits represent only one piece of equipment
each, but when expanded to cover the entire range of production
equipment, their impact could be considerably more impressive.
In a briefing before a Congressional subcommittee on military
appropriations, a Navy Captain provided the following testi-
mony :
One of the major improvements is represented by
the eighty-three numerically controlled tools currently
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on hand or under order. These tools will replace
228 standard r.achine tools and amortize their cost
in 2.2 years .-
To cite an example given at the same briefing, one
numerically controlled machine costing $150,000 will replace
four conventional machines with a total cost of $173,000.
The total cost to the Navy for the eighty-three numerically
controlled tools mentioned above is $11,066,600 and the annual
savings derived are $5,083,300.
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Direct Labor Hrs. 6-Engine Lathee. 1-N/C Lathe —
Loaded Annually: 20,000 Hro. 6,670 Hrs, 13,330 Hrs.
;
Labor: :7.36/hr. 1147,200 $49,090 $98,110
Plus: N/C
Programming _^_ fP15,476 ($15,476)
Total $147)200 $64,566 $82,634
Cost Ratio: 1 >147, 200/164, 566 = 2.28
1 . .
EXPERIENCE AT MARE ISLAND DIVISION:
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The United States shipbuilding industry is made up of
two main segments -- naval shipyards and private shipyards.
These activities build and maintain the largest mobile man-
made product in the world. Both of these segments have played
important roles in helping the United States to maintain a
strong and viable position as one of the world's great sea
powers, and also retain an acceptable mobilization base.
Many factions have sought to eliminate or sharply curtail the
role the naval shipyards play in this respect. Many of the
arguments used against the naval shipyards contain a certain
degree of bias and emotion. These arguments, nevertheless,
have undoubtedly brought pressures to bear on the nation's
policy makers which ultimately resulted in the closing of
several of the naval shipyards. Perhaps this was the wise and
prudent thing to do at the time.
All government activities need to be frequently
questioned by members of the business community as well as
special committees and subcommittees and members of the public
at large in order to remain alert and attentive to their public
trust. The arguments posed by the antagonists of the naval




improvement of those shipyards. They have prompted the Navy
to conduct many investigations into the effectiveness and
efficiency of the industrial activities. As a result of one
of the recent investigations , it was concluded that the naval
shipyards are no longer capable of optimum efficiency.
There are many reasons why this situation has develop-
ed. Some of them have to do with the physical condition of
the shipyard plant. The equipment and facilities of the ex-
isting naval shipyard complex are oriented primarily toward
the wartime requirements of the 1940' s. Individual facili-
ties in some yards have been upgraded, however, on a piece-
meal basis to meet specific needs. Most of the shipyard's
production equipment was purchased prior to 1944 and its
average age is approaching a quarter of a century.
Other reasons are in connection with workflow patterns
and adequate space. The space required for weapons systems
repair work, for example, on a modern guided missile destroyer
is five times that required by a World War II destroyer. In
addition, naval shipyards have "evolved" their present layout
and workflow by having made additions as required to the
physical plants. These additions were frequently made on a
piecemeal basis and sited wherever sufficient space could be
found. Optimum material and work flow necessary for efficient
operations was obstructed and the naval shipyards were forced






Still other reasons for the existence of less than
efficiently managed and operated shipyards revolve around an
ever increasing technology. The maintenance of highly sophis-
ticated combatant warfare systems is a much more complex
problem than that presented by the ships of the World War II
era. These problems require better, more technologically
advanced machinery and equipment. It has been concluded that
the solution to the current problems involves a massive mod-
ernization program with large doses of money. The Naval Ship
Systems Command has launched such a program to last for ten
years and to bring the naval shipyards to an acceptable level
of modernization.
A primary deterrent to efficient operations throughout
the Federal Government was the lack of sound budgeting and
accounting practices. The Federal accounting system prior to
the middle of the century was not capable of providing effec-
tive tools for proper management. Largely as a result of the
Hoover Commission Report, the National Security Act Amendments
of 1949 were passed by Congress to promote economy and effi-
ciency within the Department of Defense by providing effective
management tools. Such a tool was the Navy Industrial Fund.
The Navy Industrial Fund is primarily an accounting device to
provide for the financing of operations at Navy installations
of the industrial or commercial-type from a single fund rather
than from a great number of funds as was the case under the
traditional appropriations financing system. The Navy Indus-
trial Fund, and its subdivisions into project funds for the
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individual installations, are revolving funds in which working
capital is retained intact. Once the corpus is established,
payments for the costs of manufacturing goods or providing
services are made from the fund and reimbursement from other
appropriations is obtained in payment for goods and services
to replenish the fund and keep it intact. All reimbursement
is at cost and no profit results.
The Navy Industrial Fund provides a more effective
means for cost control over operations and promotes a greater
sense of responsibility, or cost-consciousness, in customers
of the industrial fund activity. Shipyard customers are
appropriated a fixed amount of funds to be applied toward ship
repair and overhaul and can buy from the shipyard as long as
the money lasts and then must stop. They are, therefore, in-
terested in making their money go as far as possible. This
provision also acts as a means of control. As a matter of
fact, a major purpose of Title IV was to strengthen central
review and control, and to make it more meaningful. With
respect to working-capital funds, the Title states:
No greater cost shall be incurred by the
requisitioning agency for stores, supplies,
materials, or equipment drawn from inventories,
and for services rendered or work performed by
the industrial-type or commercial-type activi-
ties for which working-capital funds are author-
ized by this section, than the amounts of appro-
priations or funds available for such purposes. -*-
Reports of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees
on the legislation make clear that this provision was intended
1




to secure control of industrial-fund operations by permitting
industrial-fund installations to undertake work only after a
customer organization had placed an obligation against its
appropriation. At one point, both Committees refer to the
working-capital concept as " . . . the means by which the
Congress continues to control the amount of money that may
be spent ..."
Yet, one of the basic principles underlying the in-
stallation of the Navy Industrial Fund was to give increased
flexibility of operation without the restrictions frequently
forced on operations by appropriation accounting. This has
been one of its major benefits and the results have been in-
creased economy and efficiency of the industrial and com-
mercial-type activities of the Navy. Managers are now able
to gather important data concerning the cost of doing business
which was not possible under the former system.
It has also been claimed that the Navy Industrial Fund
system allowed for more comparability of costs between indus-
trial fund activities themselves and with costs in private
industry. This point is of questionable value, however, since
there are a number of excluded costs in the Navy Industrial
Fund which are currently recorded only as "statistical costs"
and thus tend to distort comparability. The exclusion of
*U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Senate Report No.
366, 81st Cong., 1st sess., May 12, 1949"), p. 18. U.S., Con-
gress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Reorganizing Fiscal
Management in the National Military Establishment (House Report
No. 1064, 81st Cong., 1st sess., July 14, 1949), p. 8.
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certain costs from the prices of goods and services together
with the fact that profits are shunned causes the Navy Indus-
trial Fund to lose some of its similarities to the procedures
utilized by private industry. There is little point, however,
in debating whether a given military operation is or is not a
business. The issue is not the grand alternative of running
a shipyard, for instance, like a business, but that of finding
practical arrangements to meet practical problems — techniques
for measurement, allocation, and control. Certain business
techniques are promising in these endeavors, not because they
are business techniques, but because they appear to be the
best way of meeting practical problems.
One of the excluded costs is depreciation of equipment.
Although Public Law 87-6 51 expressed Congressional intent to
have working-capital funds reimbursed for "cost of using
equipment," the Department of Defense has not yet seen fit to
implement this intent. In 1966, as a matter of fact, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) stated that under
the Department of Defense's concept of resources management,
the long range goal is "to charge 100 per cent of measurable
expenses.
Depreciation on equipment is definitely an element of
cost and is measurable. The inclusion of this element in
^See above, p. 32.
Address of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptrol-
ler) , Robert N. Anthony, Defense Management Systems Course,




prices for v/ork performed by the naval shipyards, and for
which the Navy Industrial Fund is reimbursed, would result
in a reserve within the industrial fund. This reserve could
then be made available for financing replacement of equipment
for which replacement was deemed necessary. This concept, it
seems, has far more merit and promise than the procedure which
is now being followed. That procedure is one of requesting
funds far in advance and not really knowing the outcome of the
request for two to two and one-half years after. Not only
that, but the actual appropriation frequently differs con-
siderably from the amount requested and on occasion the re-
quest is denied altogether. Availability of funds is quite
unpredictable. These factors make it extremely difficult for
the shipyard commander to plan and maintain a modernization
schedule. In order to accomplish assigned workloads, he is
forced to expend funds for maintenance of existing equipment
which often is beyond economical repair. Timely replacement
of outmoded, obsolete equipment would eliminate many high
operating and maintenance costs and a long run operating gain
could result from increased productivity of a modern plant with
modern equipment and the reduction of direct labor and main-
tenance personnel. This flexibility is denied the shipyard
commander under the current procedure
.
In considering depreciation expense for work performed,
care must be taken to make a reasonable and practical distinc-
tion between production equipment not in use (excess capacity)
and equipment which is in use (current capacity) . The
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industrial fund is not intended to finance the cost of main-
taining excess plant and equipment. This is to be accomplished
by means of a separate appropriation and any part of excess
capacity charged against a customer's order raises the price
of the end-product and tends to aggravate and distort the
decision-making process concerning the amount of and location
of excess capacity required. Moreover, the exclusion of this
factor from the pricing of the end-product would help to re-
lieve whatever pressures might be brought to bear by the argu-
ment that a charge for depreciation would inevitably increase
the cost to the customer for work performed.
If a depreciation charge is assessed and reimbursement
is applied to a reserve for replacement, the amount collected
would be largely dependent upon the method and base for de-
preciating the equipment. An adjustment in the depreciation
to reflect current price-level of the equipment involved would
more nearly approach a "truer" cost and would recover a greater
amount of funds to be used for replacement of equipment.
The amount of funds recovered under this scheme would
probably fall short of the amount required for replacement.
This deficit should be realized and allowance should be made
for the accumulation of a regulated "profit." This profit
would fluctuate within prescribed parameters in accordance with
funds required to finance proposed capital expenditures. When
forecasted capital expenditures were small and the reserve for
replacement was adequate, the degree of profit would be negli-
gible or even non-existent. It is conceivable that there
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would be periods v/herein losses were deliberately incurred
in order to avoid the accumulation of funds beyond antici-
pated need.
It does not follow, however, that funds so collected
would be utilized by shipyards unconditionally. The funding
of equipment and the authority to replace equipment are sep-
arate problems and can be viewed as independent of one another
The Barker Committee stated that such recoveries used as a
source of financing for new machinery and equipment should be
"subject to appropriate safeguards such as approval by higher
authority." Control over usage of a depreciation reserve can
be facilitated through use of such techniques as cash fore-
casts and operating budgets. The matter of control need not
deter the institution of procedures which could be beneficial
to all parties concerned.
Although the proposal to charge depreciation as an
element of cost and include a factor for "profit" so that a
reserve for replacement could be created does have merit, its
adoption by Congress and its ready acceptance by the shipyard
customers would be difficult to achieve. The very mention of
the word profit would cause an uproar of protest. In all
fairness, it must be said that the possibility of abuse,
either wittingly or not, is greater under this proposal.
The alternative which would require the least adjust-
ment, and which already has a precedent in the Bureau of
^-See above, p. 39.
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Engraving and Printing, is one which would involve a "loan"
from the Treasury. This could be accomplished by increasing
the amount of the industrial fund through capitalization of
the equipment now held by the shipyards. This increase in
the industrial fund could then be used to purchase new equip-
ment when required. The new equipment would be depreciated
over its useful life and a charge made against the customer
for such depreciation. Each time a customer reimbursed the
industrial fund an installment on the loan would be repaid.
The only obstacle to such a proposal is the lack of
proper legislation regarding capitalization of equipment.
This legislation should be sought. Naval shipyards should be
allowed to manage their capital equipment within the context
of the industrial fund. Authority for the expenditure can be
requested through regular budgetary channels without having
to acquire an appropriation. Congress would not be so reticent
about granting authority as it would about appropriating funds.
There are many advantages to be derived from a more
flexible capital replacement program. The timely and judicious
replacement of equipment would lessen the economic impact of
spending huge sums of money on an "all-out" modernization pro-
gram by spreading these costs over the useful life of the
equipment and by replacing equipment on a staggered schedule.
The shipyard commander would be better able to plan and main-
tain realistic equipment modernization schedules because he
would have a greater degree of certainty as to the amount and
timeliness of funds available for his equipment requirements.
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Costly interrupted production caused by administrative delays
in acquiring appropriations for necessary capital equipment
could be avoided and a continuity of operations could be
achieved.
It is clear that some action must be taken. To con-
tinue in the same way would be to reject the lessons that
experience has so painfully taught. It would be unwise to
allow our nation's naval shipyards to sink to the level at
which we nov; find them after going through the time and ex-
pense of raising them to an acceptable level. The advantages
to be accrued through the proposed alternatives are worthy of
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